Wednesday, 5 December 2007

Workshop

Tomorrow and on Friday, a big bunch of TILEC members will participate to a Workshop on the Law and Economics of Competititon Policy, organised by the Max Planck Institute for Research on collective goods in Bonn, Germany (the programme in a pdf here).

My idea is to blog from there, whenever interesting points arise during the discussion. Let's see if and how it works out.

Monday, 29 October 2007

Competition and competitors

At the time the merger GE/Honeywell was blocked by the Commission, a slogan started to circulate: we Americans protect competition, you Europeans protect competitors.
A few years later, the European Commission finds that Microsoft infringed article 82, the CFI upholds the decision and some people try to recycle that slogan once again.

But something in the air has changed.
Immediately after the judgment, not less than the Economist ("Brussels rules OK") depicted European regulators as the ones playing a role in the global economy, while Uncle Sam stays at the window.

Now, discussing the Intel issue, also the NYT has contrasted the dismissive behaviour of the FTC towards big companies with the actions of European, Japanese and Korean authorities.

Is it not time for a new slogan?

Friday, 5 October 2007

Finally public

That "famous" Net Neutrality paper of ours, the one I mentioned in a couple of previous posts, is finally public. "Network Neutrality in the EU" is now an official TILEC Discussion Paper (number 2007/030) and is also available on SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018326.

Meanwhile, we managed to present it again at the IvIR (Instituut voor InformatieRecht) in Amsterdam and at the Conference of the Canadian Association of Law and Economics in Toronto.

Monday, 1 October 2007

International Gambling Conference in Tilburg

On 15 November 2007 the third international colloquium of Tilburg University will be hosted, with the title ‘The Regulation of Gambling and the Role of Crime and Addiction’. Speakers include François Trucy of the French General Assembly and Erik Vagnhammar of DG Internal Market.

For information and the registration procedure, please see http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/events/folder2007.pdf .

Friday, 28 September 2007

Live from the TILEC Retreat

TILEC members gathered today in Oisterwijk to hold their annual retreat.

Topics discussed ranged from predatory pricing to market manipulation to competition of competition laws.

Besides the academic value of the presentations, some interesting soundbites:

I could survive sweeping generalisation with an audience of only economists.

Let's assume away the problem.

Unmodelled things? Irrelevant.

If you can't make your point in one hour, you cannot make it in one hour and half.

Thursday, 20 September 2007

First reactions to Microsoft

After more than 3 years, the CFI has finally ruled on the Commission's Microsoft decision.


While waiting for the next TILEC Club Med's to discuss the judgment more in detail, some TILEC comments are already available: preliminary remarks have been given by TILEC's co-director Pierre Larouche to Het Financieele Dagblad and in the original (pdf) English version.


Besides, I'd like to link also to the Commissioner's comments.

Friday, 14 September 2007

Club Med after holidays

Interesting Club Med this week on the treatment of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) clauses. The US upreme Court in Leegin (pdf) has reversed a century-old rule treating RPM as illegal per se and has ruled that it must be now judged according to the so-called rule of reason.

The Court was split 5-4, along the (by now) familiar ideological line drawn by the recent appointment of the two new judges.

Our group, too, was split on the evaluation of the judgment. To mention just a few points that came up in the discussion: (*)

1. Civil law uneasiness: some in the group expressed their uneasiness with such an important decision being taken with almost half of the Court openly against it. McCormick was quoted: "The practice of keeping judicial argument over right and wrong behind closed doors [exists and is defended] so that the courts eventual judgment shall contribute rather to faith in the relative certainty of the law than to the revelation of its relative uncertainty."

2. On the substance of the case: economic theory is not conclusive on the welfare effects of RPM. Economic evidence is tiny and only a few empirical studies have been conducted, with divergent results. There is however a very clear risk of RPM: it can profitably be used to facilitate and reinforce horizontal cartels. All this seems to support the position that an outright per se illegality is inappropriate.

3. The new rule of reason approach is likely to produce very high costs for companies and for the legal system. RPM is likely to be often anticompetitive, hence for those cases the new rule is a net increase in the judicial costs. Moreover, the often prohibitive costs of lawsuits may discourage complaints against anticompetitive RPM clauses. In other words, while the risk of false positives is drastically reduced, the risk of false negatives seems now significant.

4. There was a certain consensus in the group that a statutory (as opposed to judicial) change from per se to rule of reason, could have provided a more satisfactory (and perhaps cost-saving) solution. A statute could have lifted the ban while at the same time filling the "void" with a (rebuttable) presumption of illegality above a certain market share, safe harbours for firms without market power, a transitory period to adjust to the new approach. A similar outcome can be achieved also by court decisions, but, probably, at much higher cost.

(*) This is just an informal summary and is not meant to represent the official views of the group

Friday, 6 July 2007

Still discussing Net Neutrality

Even if the paper mentioned in the previous post is not ready yet for publication, we have already given a few presentations about the European perspective on the network neutrality debate.

First came the Workshop on Commons Theory for Young Scholars, organised jointly by the Max Planck Institute for research on collective goods in Bonn and by the Center for Internet and Society of Stanford University. At the Workshop, Network Neutrality has been the most discussed issue of application of Commons Theory (perhaps also thanks to the presence of Larry Lessig and Tim Wu) and the participants were very interested in the peculiarities that make the European context different from the American one.

The following venue was the Symposium Netneutraliteit in The Hague, of which a report (unfortunately only in Dutch) is available here (note the nice picture at the end of the page) and another one here. An interesting point was made on the connection between Net Neutrality and ISPs liability for the content they carry: when there is no 'neutrality' and ISPs exercise control on traffic, they incur in liability. Would ISPs really want this?

Further presentations were made at the College of Europe in Bruges at the Third ELEA Symposium (European Law and Economic Analysis) and then at the Dutch Competition Authority (NMA).

Lessons learned: the topic is very technical and requires an introduction; what the problem is with network neutrality may not be so clear, hence further introduction is needed; the presentation tends to be quite long; we should hurry up with finishing the paper.

A final note: even if I cannot post the paper yet, I can show a nice picture of the authors:



Monday, 30 April 2007

Network neutrality takes off at TILEC

The network neutrality debate is regaining momentum in the US after the FCC has decided to investigate the development of broadband Internet (pdf).
Since a couple of years already, big names of the Telecom and Cyber legal world have been kept busy with the issue whether network operators should be allowed to discriminate, one way or another, among packets of data. An interesting example of the debate is the blog-style echange of opinions between a supporter and an opponent of net neutrality regulation. A group of heavyweight economists has also intervened, by signing a brief position paper opposing regulation on the matter.

Should intelligence (hence control) shift from the edges of the network to its core? Who should build the infrastructure for next-generation Internet? What will the Internet of the future look like: more as a global public network or as a bunch of privately-owned ones more or less interconnected with each other?

Leaving aside those fundamental questions for a moment, we might want to consider also a few more down to earth issues: how to make sure that market power over a bottleneck facility does not lead to abuses? How should regulators intervene (if at all) to make sure that innovation is not stifled? How to prevent that access to valuable content or applications gets blocked because of commercial (or other) reasons? Is it possible to offer prioritised services to real-time applications (online games) without making access to non-real-time ones a painful experience?

After the TILEC report (pdf) of last year on the economics of net neutrality, and after Milton Mueller's visit in February, a TILEC trio (Pierre Larouche, Ilse vd Haar and myself) is currently working on the possible European answer to some of the questions above: whether net neutrality is an actual issue to begin with, whether and in what the discussion differs from the American one, what tools already exist to help tackling the identified problems.

In a short while, we should be able to post our paper here and on SSRN.

Tuesday, 27 March 2007

EFTA and Gambling

Shortly after the decision of the European Court of Justice in Placanica, the EFTA Court gave its decision in Case E-1/06 on March 14th. In considering the legality of the Norwegian legislation in question, the EFTA Court interprets particular aspects of the case-law of the ECJ in considerable detail.

The case arose out challenges to the Norwegian Act No 90 of 29 August 2003 Relating to Amendments to the Gaming and Lottery Legislation which sought to grant an exclusive right for the operation of gaming machines to the state-owned gambling operator, Norsk Tipping. Gaming machines in Norway have been subject to a licensing regime whereby they are operated by private operators on behalf of humanitarian and socially beneficial organisations, whom receive a proportion of the revenue. Since all parties agreed that the legislation amounted to a restriction to the free movement of services and the freedom of establishment, the case concentrates upon the justifications used to uphold the restrictive measures.

Among the objectives of the legislation was that of limiting the reduction in revenue which would result from the envisaged reduction in the number of gambling machines. Having recalled standing case-law to the effect that the financing of good causes cannot amount to an objective justification to a restriction on the free movement of services (para. 36), the Court noted that the introduction of the monopoly was primarily for reducing the risk of gambling addiction (para. 37). An exclusive right system would allow for this while limiting the consequent reduction in revenues. Since this limitation exercise was an ancillary objective, the overall legitimacy of the legislation remained intact (para. 40) as the restriction was justifiable on the grounds of reducing addiction and crime.

In considering whether the restrictions were consistent and suitable for the purpose (para. 42-46) the Court highlighted the need to consider the particular characteristics of the form of gambling in question, and in light of the legislation in question, the degree of addictiveness. Given the prevalence of gambling addiction in Norway which results from slot machines the Court felt that this form of gambling was not comparable with other forms offered by Norsk Tipping. Consequently, the marketing and development of other forms of gambling by the state body was deemed irrelevant for the assessment of this gambling machine specific legislation. The ECJ has yet to make a distinction in its case-law between the differing characteristics of different forms of gambling, and how this could affect the consistency, and thus proportionality of restrictions.

In assessing the necessity of the restriction the Court considered the test to be whether the introduction of the monopoly would lead to ‘a more effective achievement of the aims set than other less restrictive measures.’ (para. 49). However this part of the proportionality test relates to whether a less restrictive but equally effective provision could be used to achieve the legislative objective. By assessing this on the basis of a more effective achievement of the objectives, the Court would appear to alter the criterion by which the national measure is to be assessed. Arguably, the assessment used rests upon the effectiveness of the measure and not its restrictiveness and nor that of any alternatives.