Wednesday, 5 December 2007
Workshop
My idea is to blog from there, whenever interesting points arise during the discussion. Let's see if and how it works out.
Monday, 29 October 2007
Competition and competitors
A few years later, the European Commission finds that Microsoft infringed article 82, the CFI upholds the decision and some people try to recycle that slogan once again.
But something in the air has changed.
Immediately after the judgment, not less than the Economist ("Brussels rules OK") depicted European regulators as the ones playing a role in the global economy, while Uncle Sam stays at the window.
Now, discussing the Intel issue, also the NYT has contrasted the dismissive behaviour of the FTC towards big companies with the actions of European, Japanese and Korean authorities.
Is it not time for a new slogan?
Friday, 5 October 2007
Finally public
Meanwhile, we managed to present it again at the IvIR (Instituut voor InformatieRecht) in Amsterdam and at the Conference of the Canadian Association of Law and Economics in Toronto.
Monday, 1 October 2007
International Gambling Conference in Tilburg
For information and the registration procedure, please see http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/events/folder2007.pdf .
Friday, 28 September 2007
Live from the TILEC Retreat
Topics discussed ranged from predatory pricing to market manipulation to competition of competition laws.
Besides the academic value of the presentations, some interesting soundbites:
I could survive sweeping generalisation with an audience of only economists.
Let's assume away the problem.
Unmodelled things? Irrelevant.
If you can't make your point in one hour, you cannot make it in one hour and half.
Thursday, 20 September 2007
First reactions to Microsoft
Friday, 14 September 2007
Club Med after holidays
The Court was split 5-4, along the (by now) familiar ideological line drawn by the recent appointment of the two new judges.
Our group, too, was split on the evaluation of the judgment. To mention just a few points that came up in the discussion: (*)
1. Civil law uneasiness: some in the group expressed their uneasiness with such an important decision being taken with almost half of the Court openly against it. McCormick was quoted: "The practice of keeping judicial argument over right and wrong behind closed doors [exists and is defended] so that the courts eventual judgment shall contribute rather to faith in the relative certainty of the law than to the revelation of its relative uncertainty."
2. On the substance of the case: economic theory is not conclusive on the welfare effects of RPM. Economic evidence is tiny and only a few empirical studies have been conducted, with divergent results. There is however a very clear risk of RPM: it can profitably be used to facilitate and reinforce horizontal cartels. All this seems to support the position that an outright per se illegality is inappropriate.
3. The new rule of reason approach is likely to produce very high costs for companies and for the legal system. RPM is likely to be often anticompetitive, hence for those cases the new rule is a net increase in the judicial costs. Moreover, the often prohibitive costs of lawsuits may discourage complaints against anticompetitive RPM clauses. In other words, while the risk of false positives is drastically reduced, the risk of false negatives seems now significant.
4. There was a certain consensus in the group that a statutory (as opposed to judicial) change from per se to rule of reason, could have provided a more satisfactory (and perhaps cost-saving) solution. A statute could have lifted the ban while at the same time filling the "void" with a (rebuttable) presumption of illegality above a certain market share, safe harbours for firms without market power, a transitory period to adjust to the new approach. A similar outcome can be achieved also by court decisions, but, probably, at much higher cost.
(*) This is just an informal summary and is not meant to represent the official views of the group
Friday, 6 July 2007
Still discussing Net Neutrality
Monday, 30 April 2007
Network neutrality takes off at TILEC
Since a couple of years already, big names of the Telecom and Cyber legal world have been kept busy with the issue whether network operators should be allowed to discriminate, one way or another, among packets of data. An interesting example of the debate is the blog-style echange of opinions between a supporter and an opponent of net neutrality regulation. A group of heavyweight economists has also intervened, by signing a brief position paper opposing regulation on the matter.
Should intelligence (hence control) shift from the edges of the network to its core? Who should build the infrastructure for next-generation Internet? What will the Internet of the future look like: more as a global public network or as a bunch of privately-owned ones more or less interconnected with each other?
Leaving aside those fundamental questions for a moment, we might want to consider also a few more down to earth issues: how to make sure that market power over a bottleneck facility does not lead to abuses? How should regulators intervene (if at all) to make sure that innovation is not stifled? How to prevent that access to valuable content or applications gets blocked because of commercial (or other) reasons? Is it possible to offer prioritised services to real-time applications (online games) without making access to non-real-time ones a painful experience?
After the TILEC report (pdf) of last year on the economics of net neutrality, and after Milton Mueller's visit in February, a TILEC trio (Pierre Larouche, Ilse vd Haar and myself) is currently working on the possible European answer to some of the questions above: whether net neutrality is an actual issue to begin with, whether and in what the discussion differs from the American one, what tools already exist to help tackling the identified problems.
In a short while, we should be able to post our paper here and on SSRN.
Tuesday, 27 March 2007
EFTA and Gambling
Shortly after the decision of the European Court of Justice in Placanica, the EFTA Court gave its decision in Case E-1/06 on March 14th. In considering the legality of the Norwegian legislation in question, the EFTA Court interprets particular aspects of the case-law of the ECJ in considerable detail.
The case arose out challenges to the Norwegian Act No 90 of 29 August 2003 Relating to Amendments to the Gaming and Lottery Legislation which sought to grant an exclusive right for the operation of gaming machines to the state-owned gambling operator, Norsk Tipping. Gaming machines in Norway have been subject to a licensing regime whereby they are operated by private operators on behalf of humanitarian and socially beneficial organisations, whom receive a proportion of the revenue. Since all parties agreed that the legislation amounted to a restriction to the free movement of services and the freedom of establishment, the case concentrates upon the justifications used to uphold the restrictive measures.
Among the objectives of the legislation was that of limiting the reduction in revenue which would result from the envisaged reduction in the number of gambling machines. Having recalled standing case-law to the effect that the financing of good causes cannot amount to an objective justification to a restriction on the free movement of services (para. 36), the Court noted that the introduction of the monopoly was primarily for reducing the risk of gambling addiction (para. 37). An exclusive right system would allow for this while limiting the consequent reduction in revenues. Since this limitation exercise was an ancillary objective, the overall legitimacy of the legislation remained intact (para. 40) as the restriction was justifiable on the grounds of reducing addiction and crime.
In considering whether the restrictions were consistent and suitable for the purpose (para. 42-46) the Court highlighted the need to consider the particular characteristics of the form of gambling in question, and in light of the legislation in question, the degree of addictiveness. Given the prevalence of gambling addiction in Norway which results from slot machines the Court felt that this form of gambling was not comparable with other forms offered by Norsk Tipping. Consequently, the marketing and development of other forms of gambling by the state body was deemed irrelevant for the assessment of this gambling machine specific legislation. The ECJ has yet to make a distinction in its case-law between the differing characteristics of different forms of gambling, and how this could affect the consistency, and thus proportionality of restrictions.
In assessing the necessity of the restriction the Court considered the test to be whether the introduction of the monopoly would lead to ‘a more effective achievement of the aims set than other less restrictive measures.’ (para. 49). However this part of the proportionality test relates to whether a less restrictive but equally effective provision could be used to achieve the legislative objective. By assessing this on the basis of a more effective achievement of the objectives, the Court would appear to alter the criterion by which the national measure is to be assessed. Arguably, the assessment used rests upon the effectiveness of the measure and not its restrictiveness and nor that of any alternatives.